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The Security of Ecology in Afghanistan 
Jeffrey De Joannis1 
 
 
We can’t ignore nature any longer, because it affects every aspect of our well-
being and even determines our survival.  Yet today...Western societies give nature little 
attention.  They push it to the sidelines of public discussion, focusing instead on the 
headline issues that regularly hijack social, economic, and political debate.  And they tend 
to dismiss people who concern themselves with nature as, at best, softheaded do-gooders, 
or at worst, eco-freak fanatics2. 
 
The twenty-first century will, in fact, be the Age of Nature.  We’ll learn, probably 
the hard way, that nature matters:  we’re not separate from it, we’re dependent on it, and 
when there’s trouble in nature, there’s trouble in society.3  
        - Thomas Homer-Dixon  
 
Homer-Dixon refers to five “tectonic stresses” synergistically confronting 
the modern world:  Population growth and urbanization, lack of reliable energy 
sources, environmental damage, climate change, and increasing economic 
inequity.  The premise of this essay is that nowhere are these stresses more 
extreme than in Afghanistan.  A geographic, political, economic, and cultural 
nexus, today the country is profoundly dysfunctional. The environmental threat 
to its existential viability is widely ignored, given the focus on internal military 
security.  The latter is important for nation-building, á la Weber’s monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force.  Yet the purpose of this essay is to explore an 
alternative view of security; long term economic prosperity of its people based 
on land sustainability. This essay identifies direct and indirect impacts from 30 
years of war on Afghan ecology, as well as non-war-related impacts. Afghanistan 
is beset with multiple layered problems that have accumulated over decades and 
cannot be solved sequentially or independently.  Success in military security 
without addressing environmental crisis may still result in a profoundly failed 
                                                 
1 Air Force Major Jeffrey De Joannis spent 14 years doing aeronautical and astronautical engineering prior to earning a graduate 
degree in International Relations and transitioning to Political Affairs Strategist.  Pending completion of additional graduate work in 
Security Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, he is slated to serve as the Air Attaché to Nigeria beginning in 2009. 
2 Thomas Homer-Dixon, The Upside of Down: Catastrophe, Creativity and the Renewal of Civilization, (Washington: 
Island Press, 2006): 12. 
3 Ibid, 17. 
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state. Most analyses of Afghanistan discuss the ecology of security, but this essay 




A Dramatic but Delicate Land 
Survival has historically been a challenge in Afghanistan.  It is a 
landlocked, arid, high altitude terrain; mainly rugged mountains and deserts. 
Deserts make up one sixth of the Texas-sized country and challenge even the 
Kuchi nomads.4  The Hindu Kush occupies two thirds of the country. Aside from 
the Solaiman ranges to the south and east, on the fringe of Indian subtropical 
monsoon, mountains are rocky, some with scattered scrubby vegetation at lower 
altitudes.5 Outside of a few watered valleys, it is a fragile ecosystem in terms of 
supportable human and animal population density.6  Crops and growing 
seasons are limited.  Topsoil is vulnerable to washing or blowing away.  Still, 
significant biodiversity has existed, and the land has sustained livelihoods based 
mainly on farming and herding, along with sporadic foraging and hunting, for 




At least 80 percent of the population is rural and relies directly on natural 
resources for subsistence and income.7  Perhaps as much as 75 percent of the 
land is suitable for sparse grazing, while only 10-15 percent is suited to 
agriculture.  Based on annual production data, arable land was 15-25 percent of 
the country prior to the Soviet invasion - about two thirds greater than today.8  
Five percent of the nation’s land has accounted for 85 percent of its agriculture. 
About half farmed land is rain supplied and other half irrigated, meaning that 
waterways are critical.9  The limited agricultural and herding areas are under 
pressure.  In some areas desertification is occurring because lands requiring 
maintenance are abandoned, while in other areas the same result accrues for the 
opposite reason - overuse and reclamation attempts.10  By 2001, one estimate had
                                                 
4 Daud S. Saba, “Afghanistan: Environmental Degradation in a Fragile Ecological Setting,” The International Journal of 
ble Development and World Ecology 8 (2001): 281. 
Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of 
: 15; Stacey Stowe, "Preserving 
ublications, 2004): 139. 
al Setting,” 282. 
Sustaina
5 Ibid. 
6 Michael K. Steinberg, Joseph J. Hobbs and Kent Mathewson, 
Indigenous Landscapes, (NY: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
7 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, (Switzerland: UNEP, 2003)
Land and Wildlife, to Restore the Afghan Identity." New York Times, March 6, 2007. 
8 Daud Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives,” Lemar-Aftaab (2001). 
9 Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter, Afghanistan, (Geneva, Switzerland: Crosslines P
10 Saba, “Afghanistan: Environmental Degradation in a Fragile Ecologic
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ltural production was 50 percent less than in 1979.11 
 
Without the southwestern Hindu Kush drainage into the Helmand River 
system, southern Afghanistan would be as foreboding as Baluchistan’s western 
desert.  In particular, the Sistan basin includes a vital connection of marshes and
lakes known as the Hamoons.  The Hamoons have been impacted by popula
growth, more intensive upstream extraction for irrigation, and changed runoff 
patterns due to hydroelectric projects.12  Forty percent of irrigated lands are 
found north of the Hindu Kush along the Amu Darya (Oxus River) basi
time of the Soviet invasion, the river ran all the way to the Aral Sea yet today it 
stops short – dried up because of over extraction by Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan for cotton and hydroelectricity.13  Irrigation systems employ natural 
and man-made open channels as well as covered karaizes.  Karaizes are 
underground horizontal channels that cross the water table at a slight grade and 
thus use gravity to divert wa
events evaporation.   
 
Foreign aid since the 1950s amounted to billions of (US) dollars.  Desp
significant missteps regarding aid management and development efforts, by 1978
Afghanistan was essentially self-sufficient for food, it exported high quality 
fruits, silk, cotton, and other products, and had growing state-owned indus
of mining, energy, transportation, communication, cement production, textiles, 
and agro-processing.14  Roughly half the GDP was based on agriculture or 
animal husbandry.  Wheat is a staple in Afghanistan, with cereals, rice and alfa
common, as well as some cotton and tobacco as cash crops.  A wide variety of 
fruits and nuts are cultivated, or in the case of pistachios, collected from w
groves.  Orchards and vineyards hav
s, grapes, olives are typical.   
 
Afghan forest cover consists of three types:  dense, mixed hardwoo
oak and cedar), open woodlands, and riparian forest.15  The dense growths ar
the eastern part of the country along the border with Pakistan.  The open 
woodlands include wild pistachios.  Such areas are very sensitive to climatic 
disturbances.  The riparian areas mainly occur around marshlands and in the 
                                                 
11 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
12 UNEP, History of Environmental Change in the Sistan Basin, (Switzerland: UNEP, 2006): 5-7, 28. 
13 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, 60. 
14 Girardet, Afghanistan, 139-140, 200. 
15 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, 63. 
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four major river systems; Amu Darya, Hari River, Kabul River and Helmand 




 at roughly 23 million.18  Over-grazing and clearance of wooded 
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vegetation to filter into the water table.  Instead, rapid runoff occurs that carries 
                                                
River.  Deforestation m
s because of the ripple effects, including loss of fertile soil.   
 
Pre-war Environment 
Gradual environmental degradation has occurred for decades and 
centuries prior to the Soviet invasion.  Dense cedar forests covered greater parts 
of Afghanistan during the time of early recorded civilizations more than 3000 
years ago.16  Much of this survived as recently as the 16th century Mughal era.17  
Over the last few hundred years, population growth increased attendant herd
goats and sheep.  There were about five million Afghans at the beginning of the 
20th century.  The population tripled by the beginning of the Soviet invasion and
today stands
restation in the 20th century was partly due to illegal and unsustainable 
lumbering. 
 
Impacts on arable land due to population pressure were measurable in
1930s but were ignored.  In the 1950s through 1970s timeframe, significant 
foreign aid came from both the West and the Soviets in the context of the Cold 
War competition.  The Afghan government showed initiative but imprudent 
strategy in backing grand large scale projects.  The US-financed and designed 
Helmand-Arghandab Valley (HAVA) hydroelectric dam project is an example
the efforts that were in vogue.  The aim was to increase crop volume and b
cash crop export based econ
ogic systems were not well suited, necessitating costly and lengthy 
compensatory measures.19 
 
The severe drought of 1998-2002 received a great deal of attention, yet
droughts are inherent in the climatic cycle.  However, droughts in the late 
century have been particularly severe due to deforestation.20  A drought from 
1970-72 killed 80,000 people (thanks in part to drastically inept government 
response).21  Water from irrigation or rain, is not slowed and captured by 
 
16 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
17 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, 63-64. 
18 Samuel S. Lieberman, “Afghanistan: Population and Development in the ‘Land of Insolence’,” Population and 
Development Review 6 (June, 1980): 271, 275; Edward Girardet, Afghanistan, 133. 
19 Lieberman, “Afghanistan: Population and Development in the ‘Land of Insolence’,” 276, 285-86. 
20 John Groninger, "Forestry and Forestry Education in Afghanistan," Journal of Forestry 104 (Dec, 2006): 426-7. 
21 Khaleda Atta, “Drought Exigency to Add to List of Problems for Afghanistan.” Lemar-Aftaab (2001). 
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away fertile soil and propagates a vicious cycle of deforestation.  One proposed 
rule of thumb is that 15 percent of a country should be forested to retain to
and ensu
psoil 
re air quality.22  At most, forests made up 4.5 percent of Afghanistan’s 







al degradation and natural resource scarcity trends over the 
last four decades.  At the heart of the clash is competition over land for herding 
een 
ion, the 1989-1994 
civil war, the 1994-2001 rise of the Taliban and war against the Northern 
Allianc
rocket launchers that made Hinds vulnerable.  Su-24 and Su-25 attack aircraft 
t. 
 
Though known for fierce resistance to outside authority, Afghans’ 
strongest identity may have to do with the land and wildlife around them.  Th
importance of wildlife is evident in their houses - symbols of specific animals 
common decorations.23  People in distinct geographical regions have made a 
living because of their knowledge of the ecology of that area.  When the area 
changes or people are forced to move, a downward spiral may occur as peopl
with vital knowledge of their ecosystem are displaced.  Even the nomads are 
subject to this stress.  Due to the diasporas of different ethnic groups and the
different ecological zones, biodiversity correlates in part to cultural diversity
There is a possibility of competition over resources triggering wider ethnic-
driven conflict as both resources and group identities are perceived to be in 
jeopardy.24  United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) reported in 
April of 2007 that the ethnic conflict in Darfur is attributable in part to climate 
change, environment
versus agriculture.   
 
Direct Effects of War 
Genghis Khan devastated much of northern and western Afghanistan.  
The Mongols ruined karaizes as far as the Mesopotamian desert, some of which 
were not repaired until the 20th century.25  In the modern era, there have b
four phases of war in Afghanistan:  The 1979-1989 Soviet invas
e, and the US/NATO entrance into the latter in 2001.   
 
The Soviets did not cause appreciable damage to urban areas, but 
developed an offensive version of “scorched earth” strategy to destroy the 
mujahidin base of material support.  The strategy was intense in the 1985-86 
timeframe, when the war had become a strategic stalemate.  In part, it was a 
reaction to improved weapons in the hands of mujahidin, including Stinger 
                                                 
22 "Environmental Disaster Looms in Afghanistan," The Ecologist 32, (Jul/Aug, 2002): 12. 
istory 
/mongols/ilkhanate.html 
23 Stowe, "Preserving Land and Wildlife, to Restore the Afghan Identity." 
24 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
25 The Applied History Research Group, “The Islamic World to 1600,” University of Calgary Multimedia H
Tutorials, retrieved from http://www.ucalgary.ca/applied_history/tutor/islam
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were brought into greater use to bomb entire villages and populated valleys
People and animals were killed and shelter, small industry, farming lands, 
grazing lands, and irrigation systems were damaged.  Approximately one 
.26  





ges prior to invasion, of which 26,000 were destroyed, 






estock, overgrazing the surviving farming 
centers caused topsoil erosion.36   
                                                
 
One estimate is that 22,000 villages and 3000 irrigation systems – perhap
as many as half of the latter in existence – were destroyed.  A United Nation
estimate reported 27 to 35 percent of all irrigation systems damaged.28  An 
estimate from the Afghan communist regime in 1988 identified 22,000 total 
villages before the invasion, of which 2,000 were destroyed and 5000 seri
damaged by 1985.29  The same year, Washington Post surmised that the 
systematic irrigation sabotage would likely be the most difficult Soviet blo
from which to recover.30  Even in the best of conditions, intensive work is 
required to maintain the intricate karaizes.  Afghan government records in 1994 
reported 35,000 total villa
 
Also destroyed were hard-to-replace vineyards, orchards, ornamental
trees, and shrubs.32  In many cases, this occurred for security reasons, i.e., to 
eliminate hiding places and ambush points.33  Destruction of vegetation along 
roads, which were important for mechanized Soviet maneuver, was common.  
Roads typically ran along narrow valleys and were good ambush sites, but 
vegetation removal to prevent such, the areas were susceptible to erosion.  
Landslides were a direct result.34  One third of the population fled their hom
leaving farms, fields, and orchards to decay.  Mines denied use of land, a
hundreds of thousands of livestock were killed from either the mines or 
bombing.35  Agriculture declined by nearly a factor of four compared to pre-1
production.  Despite the loss of liv
 
26 Richard Evans, "Scorched-Earth Warfare." Maclean's 99 (Dec 1, 1986): 32-33. 
27 Raphel, "Mired in Conflict: Effects of the Protracted Struggle in Afghanistan," 40. 
28 Tareq A. Formoli, “Impacts of the Afghan-Soviet War on Afghanistan’s Environment,” Environmental Conservation 22 
(Spring, 1995): 67. 
29 Richard M. Weintraub and Jonathan C. Randal, "Returning Afghans Would Face Many Problems; Millions of Refugees 
Would Need Food, Water, Housing After a Soviet Pullout." The Washington Post, Mar 30, 1988.  
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Girardet, Afghanistan, 140. 
33 Formoli, “Impacts of the Afghan-Soviet War on Afghanistan’s Environment,” 66. 
34 Saba, “Afghanistan: Environmental Degradation in a Fragile Ecological Setting,” 281. 
35 Girardet, Afghanistan, 140. 
36 Formoli, “Impacts of the Afghan-Soviet War on Afghanistan’s Environment,” 66. 




Before 1979, Afghanistan had a nascent program of national parks and 
protected cultural and wildlife sites.  These contributed to tourism, which 
key industry.
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gathering, or herding.  Kuchis were most affected by loss of herd animals.  Over 
                                                
37  War damage to the parks was generally quite severe.  An 
example is Paghman Canyon near Kabul, which was devastated during military 
engagements.38  Little reported is the fact that the Soviets disposed of dangerous 
substances in quantity.  Vast amounts of internationally banned pesticides were 
still stockpiled in the country in 1992, which the Soviets termed agricult
This seems dubious given the cross-purpose of destroying agricultural 
infrastructure via scorched-earth tactics.  Even less known, and unconfirmed, i




Landmines injure and kill people and animals, and deny areas for tra
farming, and grazing.  Estimates range from 10 to 20 million mines, mainly 
Soviet, making Afghanistan probably the most heavily mined country in world.4
Some mines were laid during the civil war and more by the Taliban, despite th
latter declaring them un-Islamic in 1998.41  Over 85 square miles were cleared
prior to the US invasion, but more than three times that area remains, which 
could take 20 years to clear at a steady pace.42  Half the victims are children, who
are shepherds.43  The other half is adult males, which means ripple effects to th
families for which they are breadwinners.44  A 1995 survey of refugees, Kuchi 
nomads, and rural residential Afghans (7000+ surveyed) determined that seven 
percent of resident and refugee householders had to move from their homes 
were prevented from returning to their homes, respectively.  As many as 78 
percent reported daily activities were affected by mines - that is, farming, wood-
 
37 Stephan Fuller, "Planning for Peace," Alternatives Journal 32 (2006): 7. 
38 Formoli, “Impacts of the Afghan-Soviet War on Afghanistan’s Environment,” 67. 
39 Ibid, 68. 
40 Steinberg, Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes, 67. 
41 Economist, "Asia: Cleaning-Up Time; Landmines in Afghanistan," The Economist 362 (Feb 2, 2002): 37-38. 
42 Mines cost as little as $3 to make but may cost as much as $300-400 to remove in 1995 terms, according to Neil 
Andersson, Cesar Palha da Sousa, and Sergio Paredes, "Social Cost of Land Mines in Four Countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Cambodia, and Mozambique," British Medical Journal 311 (Sep 16, 1995): 718;  According to previous Economist footnote, 
one cleanup estimate for Afghanistan is $500M, yet the annual lost opportunity cost is allegedly $720M in agriculture – 
math and logic imply that if there is any accuracy to these figures, willing expertise to clear mines must be limited and/or 
a credit mechanism does not exist to fund cleanup. 
43 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
44 Economist, "Asia: Cleaning-Up Time; Landmines in Afghanistan, 37-38. 
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a fifth of families were affected by a landmine casualty.  Those desperate enough 
to try and remove a mine had four times the chance of incident.45 
 
The Taliban 
The Taliban engaged in their own scorched-earth strategy in Wardak, 
Bamiyan, and the Shomali Plain.  People of the Shomali Plain north of Kabul 
strongly resisted Taliban, and the area was one of the last places to be occupied 
in late 90s.  In August 1999, the Taliban transformed the region from “national 
garden spot and breadbasket into a wasteland.”46  Tajiks numbering 200,000-
300,000 were driven out, swelling the refugee ranks.47  Irrigation systems were 
blown up, grapevines and walnut trees burnt, approximately 800 shops 
destroyed and at least 5000 houses torched.  The UN called the destruction 
“biblical in scale” and estimated a cost of billions and no less than a decade for 
rehabilitation.48  Karzai has labeled Shomali the single worst Taliban atrocity and 
made recovery a top priority, though chronic lack of funds and competent staff 
does not give cause for optimism.   
 
There are long term impacts from the loss of vineyards and orchards.  
Fruit and nut trees like mulberry, walnut, and pistachio are historically crucial to 
Afghan life, as they are protection against drought and vulnerability of the wheat 
crop.49  These trees had never been harmed during tribal raids and retaliations.50  
Such trees require many years to root and produce a crop.  The UN estimate of a 
decade seems overly optimistic regardless of funding.   
 
One of the most infamous Taliban acts was the destruction of the 1500 
year old giant Buddha statues in Bamiyan, in 2001.  This was a precursor to 
attack on the living inhabitants of the area due to the fierce Hazara resistance 
there. The Taliban attacked the mountain villages, systematically looting and 
burning the houses and killing everyone who did not flee.  Long term winter 
stores of food reserves were taken or destroyed and wells poisoned.51  The 
marginal sustainability of livelihood in this high altitude and cold climate of this 
central Hindu Kush area makes such destruction all the more difficult to recover. 
 
                                                 
45 Andersson, "Social Cost of Land Mines in Four Countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique."  
46 Marc Kaufman, "Afghans Return to Garden Spot Wasted by Taliban." The Washington Post, Jan 24, 2002. 
47 Ibid; Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
48 Ibid. 
49 Steinberg, Dangerous Harvest: Drug Plants and the Transformation of Indigenous Landscapes. 
50 Eyewitness accounts of foreigners prosecuting the strategy (Chechens, Pakistani, Uzbeks, Arabs) may be evidence of 
how unsavory and unprecedented this carnage was for Afghans, even for the Taliban themselves. 
51 Barry Bearak,, "Where Buddhas Fell, Lives Lie in Ruins Too," New York Times, Dec 9, 2001. 
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The Taliban were also blameworthy for environmental damage due to 
sheer negligence or ignorance. During the drought of 1998-2002, Taliban crisis 
management was incompetent at best.52  The drought contributed to death of 
1000s of livestock, loss of crops, worsening of deforestation, and environmental 
refugees to add to the pool of war refugees.  
 
Environmental Praise for War 
Paradoxically, the threat of violence has preserved natural areas. The 
Demilitarized Zone in Korea is a pristine strip of mountains, jungles, and 
wetlands that support wildlife absent elsewhere on the peninsula.  In Congo, 
violence has prevented systematic timbering and mining in wilderness areas.53  
Swiss and Afghan conservation groups have observed that the flight of people 
and threat of land mines in certain areas have allowed some species of plants and 
animals to flourish, or at least make a comeback.54  The Soviets kept troops near 
the Wakhan corridor, an alpine and sub-alpine area of great biodiversity in the 
east.  Local consensus is that the Soviets did not hunt the wildlife or mistreat the 
inhabitants.55  Fearing being mistaken as mujahudin, the locals refrained from 
hunting, allowing certain wildlife to proliferate; ibex and urial sheep even lost 
their fear of people.   
 
Indirect Effects of War 
Second order effects are more important in the socio-economic sense.  
They include loss of environmental records and administrative expertise, a 
collapse of national and local institutions for environmental education and 
management, proliferation of weapons, opium production, deforestation, 
urbanization, short-term unsustainable relief measures, and underlying much of 
the above, transformation of a quarter to a third of the population into refugees.  
A 1988 Afghan refugee estimate was three million in Pakistan, 1.5-2 million in 
Iran, and two million internal to Afghanistan.56   
 
Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic patchwork with a history of rivalries 
between groups.  The Taliban era exacerbated ethnic rivalry and vendetta, 
mainly between Pashtuns and others – especially Hazara and Tajiks, due to 
brutal practices on both sides.  This legacy may simmer for the remainder of the 
current generation, yet it is precisely the type of obstacle that may inhibit 
                                                 
52 Khaleda Atta, “Drought Exigency to Add to List of Problems for Afghanistan.” Lemar-Aftaab (2001) retrieved Feb 11, 
2008 from http://www.afghanmagazine.com/2001/2001.html#articles . 
53 Economist, "Science & Technology: The Spoils of War; the Environment," The Economist 366 (Mar 29, 2003): 88. 
54 Girardet, Afghanistan, 220. 
55 UNEP, Afghanistan: Wakhan Mission Technical Report, Switzerland: UNEP, 2003. 
56 Weintraub "Returning Afghans Would Face Many Problems; Millions of Refugees would Need Food, Water, Housing 
After a Soviet Pullout." 
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cohesive national identity and cooperation - never more critical in order to make 
government and institutions work.  Displacement and resource scarcity only 
intensify the problem.  For example, in Ghazni there are daily conflicts 
competing over water, vegetation, and grazing.57   
 
The total collapse of administrative institutions may be the most 
significant result of continuous conflict in Afghanistan.  Organic mechanisms for 
recovery have been erased in Carthaginian terms.  This is evident in the thrust of 
international assistance.  The post-Taliban agreement in Bonn literally 
apportioned institutions to various countries for rehabilitation guidance.  The US 
adopted the military, Germany the police, and so on.  Extensive influence of the 
central government has never been characteristic, but loss of institutions at 
regional and local levels has hurt environmental conservation and agriculture 
and animal husbandry.  Just as such institutions were establishing a tradition in 
the 1960s and 1970s, they atrophied with the invasion.  Today there is little in the 
way of capacity for surveying rural conditions, much less designing or 
implementing coordinated policies, for example, optimal water release 
management from dams in Helmand valley.  The UN Post-Conflict 
Environmental Assessment in 2003 was a landmark simply because it was the 
first reading of baseline knowledge of conditions in decades. 
 
Deforestation and Erosion 
Deforestation causes erosion, which ruins arable land and causes floods 
and avalanches.  A 1997 Salang Valley avalanche resulted from vegetation 
removal and killed 80 people.  In 1998, in Faryab province, 20 people and 1900 
cattle were killed in a flash flood along with 600 houses lost and over 7000 acres 
farmland damaged by loss of topsoil.  These events are directly attributable to 
deforestation and erosion and are representative of trends around the country.58  
Deforestation has been severely exacerbated by war refugees, who seek firewood 
relentlessly for survival and overgraze limited areas.  In turn, deforestation 
threatens to render agricultural capacity insufficient to support the Afghan 
population.  Prior to the invasion there was a functional local level system for 
enforcing conservation.  For example, restrictions on cutting, grazing or 
cultivating in pistachio forests were enforced by local forest wardens paid by 
district offices of the Ministry of Agriculture.59   
 
Karzai’s government currently has no capacity to replenish forests or stop 
timber poachers.60 The Taliban may have tacitly supported illegal lumbering 
                                                 
57 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
58 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives.” 
59 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, 69-70. 
60 Groninger, "Forestry and Forestry Education in Afghanistan," 428. 
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because of its link to Pakistani sources and their reliance on support from 
Pakistan.  One 1997 estimate (observing truckload rate) was 2.5 million cubic feet 
of illegal lumber sold in Pakistan, with revenues largely going to half a dozen 
government officials in Benazir Bhutto’s regime.61  Today, five Afghan 
universities have bachelor forestry programs.  In 2005, there were 100 students 
studying at Kabul and about 40 at Balkh University.  The quality of facilities and 
supplies are woeful compared to western standards, even to point of non-
working blackboards.62   
 
The prognosis for Afghan forests is poor.  One estimate is that it could 
take a century of consistent work to recover the forests to the point they were 
before 1980.63  Since the Soviet invasion, 70-90 percent of woodlands have been 
lost.  The 2003 UNEP assessment calculated that 4.5 percent pre-war hardwood 
forestland.  In 2004, estimates indicated remaining cover might be as low as 0.5 
percent!64  Open woodlands (pistachio, juniper) covered an area about ten times 
that of the hardwood forests prior to 1980.65  Satellite imagery indicates massive 
losses.  Field surveys in 2003 by UNEP around Herat, Badghis, Kunduz, and 
Takhar confirmed that a majority of previously pistachio wooded areas were 
completely barren with eroded soil.66  Photographs are as dramatic as those 
showing the border between Haiti and Dominican Republic, trees on one side 
and comparatively lunar landscape on the other. 
 
Refugees 
With the documented return of two million refugees in 2002, a total of 
four million refugees were in country, inevitably consuming firewood and 
jostling for crop space.67  Some have been driven to smuggling, opium 
cultivation, criminality, or militias.68  Economist magazine labeled the refugee 
phenomenon the most serious long term consequence of war.69  It could be the 
killer blow that wipes out forests and reduces agriculture capacity below 
subsistence level permanently.  So pressing are refugee needs, even ground cover 
around trees (twigs, leaves, needles, etc) is often absent due to scavenging for 
                                                 
61 Saba, “Afghanistan’s Natural Heritage: Problems and Perspectives;” Fred Pearce, “Afghanistan Faces an 
Environmental Crisis,” New Scientist (Jan 2, 2002) retrieved Feb 11, 2008 from 
http://wwww.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn1733; Ecologist, "Environmental Disaster Looms in Afghanistan," 12. 
62 Ibid, 428-29. 
63 Saba, “Afghanistan: Environmental Degradation in a Fragile Ecological Setting,” 284. 
64 Girardet, Afghanistan, 228. 
65 UNEP, Afghanistan: Post Conflict Environmental Assessment, 64. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Pearce, “Afghanistan Faces an Environmental Crisis.” 
68 Fuller, "Planning for Peace," 7. 
69 Economist, "Science & Technology: The Spoils of War; the Environment." 
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kindling.70  Using UNEP numbers for annual firewood requirements per family 
compared to the current remaining tree density leads to a sobering mathematical 
bottom line.71  Any greater density than one family per hectare of open 
woodland (overly optimistic) means that trees cannot keep up with demands.  
 
Refugee camps insidiously encourage dependency.  The Jalozai camp 
relied completely on aid from Doctors Without Borders.  Atta suggests a growing 
trend of disruption of traditional cultural norms:  “Dependency may irreparably 
fray the proud tradition of mutual-reliance, charity, and hospitality that held it 
together for centuries.”72  Such dependency is not only manifested 
psychologically, but physically.  Afghanistan’s potable water is extremely poor 
quality nationwide, subject to bacteria and parasites.  Refugees who have lived in 
camps for years, or even been born there, may lose old immunities.73  Journalist 
Robert Fiske deduced that the dysfunctional and brutal character and worldview 
of the Taliban regime came directly from experience growing up knowing 
nothing but refugee camps.  Essentially their reign in Afghanistan was 
“rebuild[ing] their refugee camps on a larger scale.”74   
 
 Assistance to refugees is typically an exercise in triage.  Unfortunately, 
short term relief is not necessarily good for long term livelihood.  For example, 
deep drilled wells may help some but disturb the water table and existing 
waterways such that life is harder for many more down the road.  Not all 
irrigation is good irrigation; if salts aren’t filtered out, the soil becomes infertile, 
as has occurred in the Helmand valley.  Too much water can prevent 
oxygen/carbon-dioxide exchange with vegetation.75  Hasty relief projects are 
subject to missing such holistic factors.  The paradox is that survival strategies of 
people destroy the long-term source of their own livelihood, and sometimes this 
is exacerbated by well-intended aid efforts.   
 The refugee problem has contributed to urbanization.  For example, 
pastoralists in the north, disrupted by land mines and erosion, have gravitated to 
Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.  Traditionally thinly populated and limited in 
sanitation capacity, cities today are overwhelmed in terms of water treatment, 
waste disposal, and pollution.  UNEP estimates only 12 percent of urban 
populations have access to sanitary water.  Saba singles out Kabul and Herat for 
sprawling onto surrounding fertile lands that used to feed the cities and provide 
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natural water table filtration and conservation.  The “ignorant” regimes since 
1979 have drained the wetlands around Kabul to inhibit malaria, but this policy 
has compromised the vital Deh-Sabz and Char-Dehi farmlands.76   
 
Opium Cultivation 
Since the fall of the Taliban, the Afghan economy has run on heroin, 
making up 40-60 percent of the GDP (unofficially).77  One writer calls 
Afghanistan “history’s first opium monocrop” state.78  An estimated 1.7 million 
Afghans directly cultivate opium, and more participate in trading, refining, and 
smuggling.79  Poppy producers receive a very small portion of the profit, since 
value increases tenfold from raw opium to finished heroin.80  Yet, Afghan 
farmers can earn five times as much on poppies compared to wheat.  
Abandonment of other crops results in deforested hillsides, declining soil 
fertility, soil erosion, water pollution and loss of expertise in producing 
traditional crops, which are typically combined in sophisticated mixed 
arrangements (e.g. shade trees around sun-sensitive plants).81  There is a positive 
correlation between opium production and instability in Afghanistan.  Opium is 
both causal and resultant as related to state instability.  Taliban remnants 
apparently use opium trafficking to sustain themselves, consistent with every 
indigenous combatant group since the Soviet invasion.82   
 
Where to Focus 
Long term sustainable agriculture techniques are needed along with 
functional institutions to manage agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, and 
raw materials.  Many excellent concepts exist, but capital investments are 
necessary and, aside from opium, such is a critical deficiency in Afghanistan.  
Continued insecurity prevents maximum external interest and assistance, and 
distracts domestic focus. 
Ecology transcends borders and this presents both difficulties and 
opportunities for neighboring states.  Of particular interest is water access.  The 
Sistan basin is shared by Iran and Afghanistan and has been the subject of 
argument.  A positive sign is the initiation of formal negotiations for coordinated 
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management of the area.  Iran has capital and needs water while Afghanistan 
controls the headwaters and needs capital.  The Amu Darya is another major 
shared waterway.  While other central Asian states continued the tradition of 
multilateral management after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Afghanistan has 
not participated.  This appears to be a result of degraded institutional capacity to 
engage after the conflicts of the 1990s.83 
 
In many ways sustainable land practice is traditional.  People need to 
preserve their bio-regions because they are synonymous with livelihood.  
However, the unprecedented disruptions from continuous war has necessitated 
short term survival strategies and eroded embedded commitment to sustainable 
practices.  The UN initiative for an Afghan Conservation Corps appears to be a 
model concept to balance short term relief with long term investment.  Funding 
through the central government currently allows forestry nursery growing, 
replanting site preparation, planting, and maintenance.  Further, the program 
attempts to employ the most vulnerable segments of society – disabled, widows, 
refugees, ex-combatants.84   
 
Scientist Dr Alex Deghan of USAID emphasizes that “conservation is 
critical for recovery and stability.”85  He directs legislative review, baselines 
wildlife populations, helps stimulate community-level management of natural 
resources, and helps joint conservation efforts with neighboring countries.  He 
believes “security [is] not going to be achieved through guns” but through 
conservation, because the country is so intrinsically dependent on natural 
resources and animals.86  While impressed by the average Afghan’s interest and 
dedication regarding education and environmental management, practical 
survival rules the day in many places.  Besides opium and timber smuggling, 
unregulated trapping of birds and hunting of rare animals threatens or has 
caused extinction of certain species.  Thanks to foreign buyers - Saudis for 
example - snow leopard furs fetch $400-2000 on Chicken Street in Kabul and a 
live Saker falcon may draw tens of thousands of dollars.87   
 
Conclusion 
Afghanistan’s most pressing needs are not necessarily the most important 
for its long term survival.  Klaus Toepfer, director of UNEP states, “If we are to 
help deliver a stable future for this country…the environment must be factored 
into rehabilitation and future planning.  For the environment is not a luxury but 
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the basis for economic development and livelihoods.”88  In January 2006, 
legislation passed for first time to protect natural resources.  The UN admits it 
will be difficult to translate into rapid practical success.  The collapse of 
institutions during the war and weakness of central government underlies the 
problem.   
 
The 2008 Afghanistan Study Group Report discusses “economic 
development and reconstruction,” but fails to explicitly connect this to the 
environment.89  One unnamed European aid representative in Kabul 
acknowledged, “The environment is not exactly one of our priority concerns 
although there is no question that it should be.”90  The desk officer for 
Afghanistan at NATO headquarters admitted that the environment was not a 
consideration for the operations division.91  A Pakistani army general with 
experience combating Taliban in the Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 
confirmed that environmental issues were inconsequential in the context of 
security operations.92  Yet, he reported that the most effective means in the 
development strategy to generate local tribal support against the Taliban was 
facilitating water management via wells and irrigation projects. 
 
A potential emerging international norm is intervention in states that 
brutalize their own populations.  As the effects of global climate change are 
realized, the strategic international importance of environment and ecology will 
increase.  Is it possible that the norm on the horizon is intervention in states that 
brutalize their environments?  The current post-hurricane crisis in Myanmar 
might make for an early case study.   
 
The New American Foundation think tank observes Pakistan’s reliance on 
the snow pack in the Himalayas for water.  Researchers predict a danger of 
population growth plus climate change resulting in much of the country turning 
to desert by 2030.  Author Anatol suggests that ecological trauma arising from 
climatic change in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region will provide an 
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overwhelming challenge for tenuous governments and a new opening for 
Islamists to exploit for political gain.93 
 
The problems that have built up over the last 30 years in Afghanistan are 
so intertwined that they cannot be solved sequentially and independently.  As 
Homer-Dixon observes, “We tend to ‘silo’ our problems.  We look at our 
challenges in isolation, so we don’t see the whole picture.  But when several 
stresses come together at the same time, they can produce an impact far greater 
than their individual impacts.”94  This is precisely what makes the situation of 
Afghanistan so immensely difficult.  It is quite possible to win the military 
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